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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Amicus curiae Society of Professional Journalists, Utah
Headliners Chapter ("SPJ"), adopts the questions presented in the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages iv-v.

In particular,

this brief addresses:
1.

Did the Court of Appeals err when it refused to

consider whether statements

in a newspaper political opinion

column that an elected official changed his position on an issue
of

public

concern

after

a political

campaign

are

protected

opinion under Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution?
2.
statements

Did the Court of Appeals err when it decided that

in a newspaper

political

opinion

column

that

an

elected official changed his position on an issue of public
concern after a political campaign are not protected opinion
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals err in suggesting that a

newspaper publisher seeking prepublication legal review of an
opinion column is evidence of actual malice?
4.

Did the Court of Appeals err in suggesting that a

newspaper's publication of a rebuttal letter to the editor is
evidence that an accompanying opinion column was published with
actual malice?
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5.

Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a

statement in a newspaper opinion column that an elected official
during a political campaign "attempted to manipulate the press"
is capable of defamatory meaning under Utah law?
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals decision has not been published.
A copy of the slip opinion

is attached

as Appendix A to the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals
1992.

decision was

filed

on May 28,

This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to
this case are set forth in Appendix B of the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amicus curiae SPJ adopts the Statement of the Case and
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review set
forth on pages 1-7 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
ARGUMENT
This case is about freedom of the press to report and
comment on politics.

The free expression "constitutional guaran-

tee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
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conduct of campaigns for public office." Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72

(1971).

If the Court of Appeals

decision in this case were the final word, it would produce a
chilling shrinkage of the marketplace of ideas and deviate from
established constitutional norms.

Press coverage of politics and

constitutional freedoms would suffer.
The Court of Appeals decision is divided into three
sections

entitled

"Opinion

Privilege,"

"Actual

Malice," and

"Manipulation of the Press." Each section is flawed.

This brief

will point to a few of the more serious errors.

In each

instance, the standard for this Court's discretionary review set
forth

in

Rule

46

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure—"special and important reasons"—is satisfied.
I.

FLAWS IN THE OPINION PRIVILEGE ANALYSIS
A.

The Court of Appeals Erroneously Failed to
Address Whether Article I. Section 15 of the
Utah Constitution Protects the Statements at
Issue
The Court of Appeals refused to consider whether the

The Daily Spectrum opinion column statements regarding Mr. West's
position

on municipal

power

are protected

under

Article

I,

section 15 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "No law
shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or
of the press." The court below said this issue had not been

-3-

raised

in the trial court•

West v. Thompson Newspapers, No,

910066, slip op. 7 n.5 (Utah App. May 28, 1992) ("West").
The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of fact and law.
First,

the

protection

Constitution was

of Article

in fact raised

I,

section

15

of

the

Utah

as an affirmative defense in

petitioner's answer to the complaint,

and petitioner's counsel

argued that the Utah Constitution protected the statements at
issue at oral argument in support of summary judgment.

Moreover,

the opinion privilege question generally has been a centerpiece
of this lawsuit.
Second, in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988), this
Court declared: "Our long-standing rule is that this Court may
affirm a judgment of a lower court on a ground other than that
relied on by that court." Id. at 561 (citations omitted).

The

trial court in Cox dismissed the plaintiffs' defamation claim on
First Amendment grounds.

On appeal, this Court held that "the

First Amendment does not bar the defamation action," but nonetheless affirmed the dismissal because the complaint failed to state
a defamation claim under Utah law.

Id. at 561-62.

In the instant defamation case, the trial court granted
summary

judgment

First Amendment.

on the opinion privilege

issue based on the

If, as in Cox, the First Amendment does not bar

the action, affirmance of the trial court would nonetheless be
appropriate, as in Cox, if the statements at issue are otherwise
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protected

as opinion under Utah law—in

this case, the Utah

Constitution.
Amicus curiae SPJ filed a brief in the Court of Appeals
addressing

state

constitutional

protection

of

opinion

under

Article I, section 15, and proposes to do the same in this Court
if certiorari is granted.

The Court of Appeals erred in failing

to address this important question of state constitutional law,
"which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme
Court."
B.

Rule 46(d), Utah R. App. P.
The Court of Appeals Erroneously
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
Statements at Issue

Applied
to the

In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. . 110 S. Ct. 2695
(1990), the United States Supreme Court concluded that lower
courts

had

been

mistaken

in

thinking

that

there

free-standing First Amendment privilege for opinion.

is

a

Instead,

the proper analysis asks whether a statement on a matter of
public concern can be proven as false.

Id. at 2706.

cannot, then there is First Amendment protection.

If it

See Philadel-

phia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
In deciding whether the The Daily Spectrum statements
in this case are protected under Milkovich. the Court of Appeals
fell into a linguistic trap that produced faulty analysis and
deprived

the petitioners

protection.

their

full

scope

of

constitutional

If allowed to stand, this cramped interpretation of
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Milkovich risks unnecessary self-censorship of editorial opinion
writing about politics.
The

Court

of

Appeals

failed

to

recognize

a

common

distinction in defamation law between statements that on their
face may be false and defamatory and statements'
that may

be

implication

false
case.

and

defamatory.

See R.

Problems 50-51 (1980).

Sack,

This
Libel,

is a

implications

defamation-by-

Slander,

and

Related

The statements on their face said that

Mr. West changed his position on municipal power after the 1987
election.

As the lower court concluded, that statement can be

proved true or false.

However, it is not defamatory.

What

troubles Mr. West is the arguable implication that he misled his
constituents.

That implication, under Milkovich. is protected

under the First Amendment

because it cannot be proven true or

false.
The fallacy in the lower court's opinion is that it
erroneously combined the nondefamatory factual statements about
Mr.

West

changing

his

position

on

municipal

power

possible implication that he misled constituents.

with

the

The Court of

Appeals asserted that "the connotation" of the opinion columns
could

"be

proven

false

by

proving

1

the

underlying

factual

"[A]n embarrassing, even though false, statement that does
not damage one's reputation is not actionable as libel or slander." Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988).
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assertion

false," West, slip op. 12, but the

follows logically from the latter.

former hardly

Accordingly, the Court of

Appeals decision misapplied Milkovich, and, in light of "the
special

and

important" First Amendment

error, should be reviewed by this Court.

consequences

of this

Rule 46, Utah R. App.

P.
II.

FLAWS IN THE ACTUAL MALICE ANALYSIS
Amicus curiae SPJ wishes to focus on two flaws in the

lower court's actual malice analysis that would have profound
consequences on reporting and editorial practices and that should
receive this Court's review.
A.

The Court of Appeals Erroneously Suggested
that Evidence of the Press Seeking Legal
Advice During the Editorial Process Is
Probative of Actual Malice
Although lacking precision on this point, the lower

court's majority opinion appears to suggest that prepublication
legal review of newspaper copy may be evidence of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice": "knowledge that [the publication] was false or . . . reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).

West, slip op.

14-15.

Any such suggestion would turn New York Times on its

head,

undermine

responsible

reporting

and

editorial

decision-making, and compromise the attorney-client relationship
in the field of journalism.

-7-

If anything, evidence that a reporter or editor consulted counsel before publication should be probative that the
reporter or editor had not "in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of the publication." St. Amant v. Thompson. 390 U.S.
727,

731

(1968).

Courts have relied

in part

on evidence of

prepublication

legal review to grant summary judgment in libel

cases

ground

on

the

of

lack

of

actual

malice.

See,

e.g. ,

Cervantes v. Time. Inc.. 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied.

409

U.S.

1125

(1973);

Fadell

v.

Minneapolis

Star

&

Tribune Co.. 425 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd. 557 F.2d
107 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Cardillo v.
Doubledav & Co.. 366 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd. 518 F.2d
638 (2d Cir. 1975) .
Where, as here, a defamation defendant chooses to waive
the

attorney-client

privilege

and

subject

both

attorney

and

client to discovery, this should demonstrate the defendant's lack
of

subjective

doubt

in

light

of

the

reporter's

or

editor's

caution and responsibility to review the proposed publication and
its sources with
Related

Problems

counsel.
221

See R.

(1980).

Sack,

Where,

Libel,
as

Slander,

here,

with

and
the

attorney-client privilege waived, there is no evidence that the
defendant expressed doubt about accuracy to counsel or published
against advice of counsel or that counsel expressed concern about

-8-

legal risk that went unheeded,

it would be unprecedented for the

fact of prepublication legal review to defeat summary judgment
and create a jury issue as to whether defendant published with a
"high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity."

Garrison

v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
The widespread practice of prepublication legal review
is the product of news organizations seeking to secure their
reputations for "accuracy and fairness."
Privacy

(2d ed. 1991).

likely produce

B. Sanford, Libel and

The Court of Appeals' analysis would

less responsible

journalism

by discouraging a

reporter or editor facing legal uncertainty from seeking counsel
out of fear that doing so would create defamation

liability

exposure.

editorial

Not only would this hamper responsible

decisionmaking

and compromise First Amendment

protections, it

would undermine the policy underlying the attorney-client relationship of encouraging the client to engage in full and frank
communication with counsel.

This important question of "federal

2

In Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), rev'd. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.)# cert, denied sub nom.
Hotchner v. Doubledav & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977), the trial judge
denied summary judgment for defendant
because, among other
things, the publisher disclosed that its lawyers were concerned
that the publication's statements "border on ' malice' (in the
legal sense)." The publisher did revise the text, but did not
intend to change the substance and did not further check the
accuracy. 404 F. Supp. at 1048-49.
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[constitutional] law . . • should be . . . settled by the Supreme
Court."

Rule 46(d), Utah R. App. P.

B.

The Court of Appeals Erroneously Suggested
that Publication of a Rebuttal Letter to the
Editor Is Probative of Actual Malice
Again

appears

to

Spectrum's

lacking

accept

Mr.

publication

definitiveness,
West's

the

contention

of his rebuttal

majority

that

letter

the
to

opinion

The

the

Daily

editor,

irrespective of its content, is circumstantial evidence that an
accompanying

article was published with actual malice.
3
. .
.
.

slip op. 14.

West,

The decision to publish the letter, if anything,

evidences confidence in the accompanying column and a remarkable
attempt to be fair to Mr. West.

Courts generally regard evidence

of reporting both sides of a controversy as demonstrating lack of
actual malice.
987

For example, in Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp.

(M.D. Tenn.

1981),

a reporter

officer and a truck driver.
harassed him.

contacted

a highway

patrol

The driver claimed the patrolman had

The newspaper published an article reporting both

sides of the dispute, and the patrolman sued for defamation.

3

The

Regardless of the form it takes—letter to the editor,
face-to-face interview, telephone conversation, copies of preexisting material—rebuttal information provided by the person who
is the subject of an article to the publisher may create doubt
about the accuracy of the work in progress and be probative of
actual malice if the publisher proceeds to publish in the face of
this information. That is not the issue raised here. The only
question is whether the publisher's decision to publish a rebuttal letter to the editor is itself evidence of actual malice.
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court granted summary judgment because the patrolman's "denials
would not support an inference that [the reporter] acted with
reckless disregard in writing a story containing both versions
rather than withholding the story altogether." Id. at 992-93.
The Court of Appeals' approach would discourage the
press from publishing comment, even denials, from those who are
the subject of critical reporting or from publishing information
in the face of denials altogether because doing so would increase
the risk of creating a jury issue on the question of actual
malice.

This deterrent hardly serves the core purpose of the New

York Times First Amendment actual malice standard of diminishing
"self-censorship."

376 U.S. at 279.

Indeed, the The Daily

Spectrum's willingness to publish a lengthy letter from Mr. West
furthers the "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate

on

public

issues

should

be

uninhibited,

robust

and

wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964).

This important question of "federal [constitutional] law

. . . should be . . . settled by the Supreme Court."

Rule 46(d),

Utah R. App. P.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A STATEMENT
THAT MR. WEST ATTEMPTED TO MANIPULATE THE PRESS IS
CAPABLE OF DEFAMATORY MEANING
The trial court in this case correctly held that the
newspaper's allegation that Mr. West attempted to manipulate the
press is not defamatory as a matter of law.

-11-

The Court of

Appeals, relying on a secondary dictionary definition rather than
the political and editorial context in which the statement was
made, decided this is a jury issue.

West, slip op. 16-18.

No politician or public official would welcome charges
of manipulating the press and many indeed may find such charges
offensive. However,

"[a] publication

is not defamatory

simply

because it is nettlesome or embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even
because it makes a false statement about the plaintiff." Cox v.
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988).

As Judge Garff correctly

concluded in his dissenting opinion in this case, "the statements
are

not

defamatory

'impeach

as

a matter

[West's] honesty,

of

law

because

or

ridicule.'"

(quoting

citing Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1)
The

statement

at

issue

do

not

integrity, virtue, or reputation or

publish his . . . defects or expose him . . . .
contempt,

they

here

Cox.

761 P.2d

(1988)).

should

to public hatred,

be

at

561, and

West, slip op. 19.
held

to

be

both

nondefamatory and protected opinion.
The
whether

the

defamatory.

context
statements

of

the

remarks

are merely

is

crucial

critically

to

deciding

unflattering

or

See B. Sanford, Libel and Privacy 98 (2d ed. 1991).

Courts frequently dismiss as nonactionable sharp commentary made
in the

setting

of public

debate.

For example,

in Greenbelt

Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), the
Supreme

Court

of

the

United

States

42-

found

protected

and

non-

libelous a newspaper's republication of a speaker's comment at a
city council meeting accusing the plaintiff of "blackmailing" the
city in pending negotiations.

In a case directly on point, a

radio station's allegation that a mayor running for reelection
was a "deceptive individual" who "often misleads, if not blatantly lies" to reporters was found not libelous.

Craig v.

Moore. 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1402 (Fla. Cir. 1978).
On this issue the decision below appears to be in
conflict with this Court's decision in Cox and with Milkovich as
well.

It merits review under Rule 46(b),(d), Utah R. App. P.
CONCLUSION
This case has the potential to have a significant

impact on press reporting and editing about politics in the State
of Utah and perhaps other jurisdictions as well.

The Court of

Appeals decision would likely induce press self-censorship in
conflict with press freedoms guaranteed under the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution and the Article I, section 15
of the Utah Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, amicus
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curiae SPJ respectfully urges this Court to grant the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,

June 19, 1992

By

SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR.
Attorney for Society of
Professional Journalists,
Amicus Curiae
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